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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, USA (G-2)
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)
Colonel Jack E. Thomas, USAF (AFOIN-2A)
Captain John A. Holbrook, USN (JIG)

SUBJECT : SE-34: Consequences of an Attempt to Overthrow
the Present Regime in Albania

1. The production of this estimate was authorized and directed by the IAC on 20 November. Its priority is: Urgent.
2. The extraordinary procedure recommended for producing a draft for early IAC consideration stems from (a) the short deadline; and (b) the need for special security handling.
3. Because of the need for special handling, only two copies of the terms of reference are enclosed.
4. Our tentative schedule for getting a text to the IAC follows:

Meeting of IAC representatives for oral contributions	2 PM	2 Dec.
Board meeting on a draft estimate	10 AM	5 Dec.
Draft to IAC representatives	9 AM	8 Dec.
Meeting of IAC representatives on draft	10 AM	12 Dec.
Clean-up session with IAC rep- resentatives	10 AM	16 Dec.
IAC meeting	10:30 AM	18 Dec.

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5. Hence the only meeting of the IAC representatives prior to the preparation of a draft by this Office for subsequent consideration by the representatives will be at 2:00 Tuesday, 2 December.

6. At the 2 December meeting we request that your representative be prepared to give us orally (or by rough notes) your views on the questions raised in the attached terms of reference. (We are taking for granted the substance of the NIE-29 series and the NIE-42 series unless departure from the conclusions therein is indicated by the present problem.)

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Executive Secretary

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Security Information

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SUBJECT: SE-34: TERMS OF REFERENCE: CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTEMPT
TO OVERTHROW THE PRESENT REGIME IN ALBANIA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the consequences of an attempt to overthrow the
present regime in Albania.

SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS

It has been previously estimated (NIE-42/1) that the present
regime in Albania could be overthrown only if there were external
inducements and external assistance. The source and nature of these
inducements and assistance will affect the outcome of the venture, the
reactions of other countries, the nature of the new regime, and probable
developments after the new regime was installed.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. PRESENT ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ALBANIAN REGIME AND TOWARD THE
STATUS QUO IN THE BALKANS

- A. Albanian people -- What is their attitude toward the present regime? What would be the preferred alternative?
- B. USSR -- How do the Kremlin leaders look at Albania? How important is it to them? What indications are there of present Soviet intentions toward Albania?
- C. Yugoslavia -- What are present Yugoslav intentions? Is there any indication of a change since publication of NIE-42/1?
- D. Italy -- What are Italian interests, aspirations, and intentions in Albania? What is the Italian attitude toward maintenance of the Status quo in Albania?
- E. Greece -- What are Greek interests, aspirations, and intentions in Albania? What is the Greek attitude toward maintenance of the status quo in Albania?
- F. The UK -- What are British interests, aspirations, and intentions in Albania? What is the British attitude toward maintenance of the status quo in Albania?

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II. PROBABLE REACTIONS TO A COUP ATTEMPT

For each of the following sets of questions, distinguish where appropriate between coup attempts (a) sponsored by the Yugoslavs, (b) supported jointly by the US and Yugoslavia, or (c) supported by the US. Indicate in each instance the evidence or reasoning in support of the judgment.

A. USSR

1. Would the Kremlin associate the US with any coup attempt regardless of its real source?
2. How would the USSR react?
 - a. Would the USSR provide direct assistance to Hoxha, either by air or sea, or by marching across Yugoslav territory?
 - b. Would it, as an alternative, direct the Satellites to provide assistance, through direct attack via Yugoslavia or merely by infiltration tactics?
 - c. Would it make counter moves in other parts of the globe (e.g., Berlin, Iran, etc.)?
 - d. Would the USSR accept the probable loss of Albania and confine its reaction to political and diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere?

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B. European Satellites

1. If directed by the USSR to assist the Albanian regime, would the Satellites be capable of doing so? Would they show enthusiasm or drag their feet?

C. Greece

1. If forewarned, would the Greeks agree to abide by the results, or would they insist upon a role in the attempt and a division of the spoils?
2. If not forewarned, would the Greeks seize the opportunity to occupy Northern Epirus?

D. Yugoslavia

1. Would the Yugoslavs agree to cooperate with the US on any other basis than US acceptance of Tito-dominated new Albanian regime?
2. If not advised in advance of a US-supported coup, would the Yugoslavs seize the opportunity (a) to march in and occupy part of the country or (b) to set up a rival revolutionary government?

E. Italy

1. Upon what terms would Italy agree to cooperate in providing base support for a coup attempt?

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2. If not forewarned, would Italy make a show of force in order to play a role in the new regime?

F. The UK

1. Would the UK agree to cooperate with the effort? To what extent and on what terms?

G. The European NATO Powers

1. Would the NATO countries politically support Yugoslavia and/or the US in the event of Soviet-Satellite counteraction? If that counteraction included local military action? or
2. Would the NATO countries become fearful of Soviet counteraction and condemn the coup attempt?

- H. The UN -- Would a coup attempt be likely to provoke an appeal to the UN? If so, what positions would be taken by the various member nations?

III. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A SUCCESSFUL COUP

In answering the following questions, distinguish where appropriate between coups (a) sponsored by the Yugoslavs, (b) supported by the US and Yugoslavia, and (c) supported by the US.

A. Internal

1. What internal security problems would the new regime face?
2. What would be the regime's economic problems? What kind and how much economic assistance would be required?

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3. What would be the internal consequences of a US security guarantee? If no US guarantee?

B. External

1. What would be the effect of a US security guarantee upon Soviet, Yugoslav, Italian and Greek actions?
2. If there were no US guarantee, what courses of action would the USSR, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy pursue toward the new regime?
3. What would be the impact of a new regime upon the Balkans? Would rivalries between Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia be intensified? If so, would it interfere with their developing cooperation in the military field?
4. What would be the impact of a successful coup on:
 - a. The USSR -- how would this affect Soviet estimates of US intentions and Soviet courses of action?
 - b. The Satellites -- would overt resistance to the USSR be stimulated in the Satellites? What effect would the coup have on the Soviet hold on the Satellites?
 - c. The NATO countries -- how would this affect the cooperation of the NATO countries with the US -- the rearmament effort?

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- d. The Western strategic position in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean?
- e. The overall morale of the non-Communist world?
- f. The US political and propaganda position in the non-Communist world?

IV. WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL COUP ON:

- A. Soviet policies and courses of action
- B. The Satellites
- C. The Balkans
- D. The NATO countries
- E. The rest of the non-Communist world.

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